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Lecture 01 - Introduction: Five First Lessons. We introduce Game Theory by playing a game. We organize the game into players, their strategies, and their goals or payoffs; and we learn that we should decide what our goals are before we make choices.
666 years, 7 months
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With some plausible payoffs, our game is a prisoners' dilemma. We learn that we should never choose a dominated strategy; but that rational play by rational players can lead to bad outcomes. We discuss some prisoners' dilemmas in the real world and some possible real-world remedies. With other plausible payoffs, our game is a coordination problem and has very different outcomes: so different payoffs matter. We often need to think, not only about our own payoffs, but also others' payoffs. We should put ourselves in others' shoes and try to predict what they will do. This is the essence of strategic thinking. (from oyc.yale.edu)
Course Currilcum
- Lecture 01 – Introduction: Five First Lessons Unlimited
- Lecture 02 – Putting Yourselves into Other People’s Shoes Unlimited
- Lecture 03 – Iterative Deletion and the Median-Voter Theorem Unlimited
- Lecture 04 – Best Responses in Soccer and Business Partnerships Unlimited
- Lecture 05 – Nash Equilibrium: Bad Fashion and Bank Runs Unlimited
- Lecture 06 – Nash Equilibrium: Dating and Cournot Unlimited
- Lecture 07 – Nash Equilibrium: Shopping, Standing and Voting on a Line Unlimited
- Lecture 08 – Nash Equilibrium: Location, Segregation and Randomization Unlimited
- Lecture 09 – Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis Unlimited
- Lecture 10 – Mixed Strategies in Baseball, Dating and Paying Your Taxes Unlimited
- Lecture 11 – Evolutionary Stability: Cooperation, Mutation, and Equilibrium Unlimited
- Lecture 12 – Evolutionary Stability: Social Convention, Aggression, and Cycles Unlimited
- Lecture 13 – Sequential Games: Moral Hazard, Incentives, and Hungry Lions Unlimited
- Lecture 14 – Backward Induction: Commitment, Spies, and First-Mover Advantages Unlimited
- Lecture 15 – Backward Induction: Chess, Strategies, and Credible Threats Unlimited
- Lecture 16 – Backward Induction: Reputation and Duels Unlimited
- Lecture 17 – Backward Induction: Ultimatums and Bargaining Unlimited
- Lecture 18 – Imperfect Information: Information Sets and Sub-Game Perfection Unlimited
- Lecture 19 – Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Matchmaking and Strategic Investments Unlimited
- Lecture 20 – Subgame Perfect Equilibrium: Wars of Attrition Unlimited
- Lecture 21 – Repeated Games: Cooperation vs. the End Game Unlimited
- Lecture 22 – Repeated Games: Cheating, Punishment, and Outsourcing Unlimited
- Lecture 23 – Asymmetric Information: Silence, Signaling and Suffering Education Unlimited
- Lecture 24 – Asymmetric Information: Auctions and the Winner’s Course Unlimited
